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The fighting has diminished in intensity, but the financial and economic situation in Ukraine 
continues to deteriorate. With the currency in free fall and the banking system in a systemic 
crisis, it is apparent that massive financial support is needed to prevent a collapse. A key 
question, however, is where should the money go.  
Traditional support from the IMF goes to the government and is then used to support banks 
or to plug holes in the budget. The macro-financial assistance (MFA) of the EU is usually just 
a supplement to the IMF support to the government. So far, the European Commission has 
disbursed €1.36 billion to Ukraine under two ongoing MFA programmes for the country. Upon 
the disbursement of the most recent tranche of the loan, the European Commissioner for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, Pierre Moscovici, announced: "Europe 
is delivering on its commitment of solidarity to Ukraine. We are providing essential financial 
support at a time of extraordinary economic and social challenges for the Ukrainian people. In 
turn, it is vital for the country to maintain the momentum of reform so as to create the 
conditions for sustainable prosperity for all Ukrainians."  
The billions more that the EU has promised (see Annex) are not likely to be forthcoming any 
time soon, as the donors conference on Ukraine has been postponed until the new Ukrainian 
government develops a medium- to long-term strategy to implement structural reforms aimed 
at improving governance, delivering sustainable economic growth and supporting legal 
harmonisation with the EU. This risks leading to a long drawn-out process under which much-
needed reforms, such as increasing energy prices, are delayed until the overall financial 
package has been agreed by all parties. 
One important issue in this context, however, is whether the Ukrainian government should 
pay back the foreign financial support that matures in the future. Whereas the EU funds are 
on loan to Ukraine for a period of 15 years at a low interest rate, almost all experts agree that 
this condition does not make sense.  The financial support from the IMF, the EU and other 
donors should not be used to finance the exit of foreign investors, especially given that a large 
share of Ukrainian bonds is held by one hedge fund.   
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Instead of paying back the principal, the Ukrainian government should negotiate a 
rescheduling.  This should be possible without generating any financial market instability, 
given that the case of rescheduling is obvious for a country in war. 
 However, even if the country can reschedule its debt it will need billions in financial support 
to plug the gaping hole in the budget, much of which comes from keeping energy and gas 
prices way below the import price the government has to pay to Gazprom. With energy prices 
aligned with world market prices, the need for budgetary support would be much reduced. 
While the exhortation to 'increase energy prices' may sound easy, it needs to be accompanied 
by measures on the ground. Two areas are key: i) energy-saving investment and ii) support 
for the energy poor. 
The EU could help on both fronts, and not just by providing funds to be spent on EU experts 
offering technical assistance. Rather than offering EU funding for technical assistance projects 
in Ukraine provided in the form of grants, contracts and – worryingly – budget support, what 
is needed is humanitarian assistance that alleviates the stress on those in need. Given the 
magnitude of corruption and inefficiency in the country, it would be irresponsible to channel 
a large amount of funding for this purpose through the government. Arguably, such funding 
should be disbursed directly to the beneficiaries on the ground, without going through the 
Ukrainian administration. 
Experience in Eastern Europe, where energy prices had to be increased substantially in the 
1990s, demonstrated that simple measures – such as better insulation, together with 
maintenance and repair of the region’s many long-neglected central heating systems – yield a 
quick and substantial payoff in reducing energy intensity. Even a slight improvement in 
Ukraine’s energy efficiency would significantly reduce the country's dependency on Russian 
gas.  
Thus, what is needed is an emergency programme, to be administered directly by a joint EU-
Ukrainian task force, under which energy savings projects can be evaluated, approved and 
paid for on the ground, at the neighbourhood level. One should send many hundreds of small 
groups (in the interest of speed probably organised by Member States, but acting under an EU 
umbrella) to the municipalities, armed with euros and ready to disburse the money for 
thousands of small projects with a minimum of formality but a maximum of transparency (e.g. 
quick but open tenders, with 'neighborhood committees' allowed to see all the bills). Central 
and Eastern European member states, especially those whose languages are similar to Russian 
and Ukrainian, should be able to quickly mobilise the required technical expertise. Rapid 
disbursement of the funds would also have a strong impact on local economies and on public 
opinion, even on the minority who still views the EU with suspicion. 
Local NGOs and other civil society organisations, which are trusted much more than the 
administration, should be involved at all stages. The EU knows them and has recently 
earmarked €10 million to support civil society organisations in the country. 
A similar approach should be used to provide direct social-security assistance to the energy-
poor.  Instead of providing billions to the Ukrainian ministries, the money could be spent 
much better by handing out cash in euros on the ground.  Here again a large number of small 
groups would be needed to cross-check social-security records and heating bills to verify the 
case for compensation for higher energy prices and thus avoid abuse and misuse of the 
programme. 
This approach would constitute a sea change in the way the EU supports Ukraine.  The overall 
financial assistance by the EU to the country exceeds €10 billion euro, but direct expenditure 
on the ground (for humanitarian and recovery support) amounts to less than €100 million, or 
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about 1% of the total. This is the wrong proportion. Given the widespread government 
corruption and inefficiency, such programmes will be nothing more than a drop in the ocean. 
What is needed are programmes that by-pass the authorities. 
A delicate question is whether EU support should also be offered in the 'occupied areas'. We 
would recommend that this should be done only on the condition that the security of EU and 
member states' personnel can be guaranteed and that they are accompanied by independent 
OSCE observers.  The offer should thus be valid also for the territories of the so-called Luhansk 
and Donetsk Peoples’ Republics. If the self-declared authorities there do not accept these 
conditions, this would be clear evidence that they are not interested in the well-being of the 
local population. 
In sum, the macroeconomic situation is disastrous and some macro-financial assistance to the 
government is unavoidable. But this kind of support should be limited to the necessary 
minimum. Independently of the macro picture, the EU should act on the ground by financing 
quick small-scale energy savings investments and a direct distribution of EU money to energy-
poor pensioners.  Directly distributing euros in this way would constitute a much more 
effective form of support as it would immediately benefit the local economy. 
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Annex: The standard approach: Throw billions at Kiev 
The EU programme of financial and technical cooperation supports Ukraine’s ambitious 
reform agenda. More than 250 projects are currently being carried out across a wide range of 
sectors, regions and cities in Ukraine. EU assistance focuses in particular on support for 
democratic development and good governance, regulatory reform and administrative 
capacity-building, infrastructure development and nuclear safety. EU funding for projects in 
Ukraine is provided in the form of grants, contracts and – increasingly – budget support. 
On 5 March 2014, the European Commission agreed on a financial assistance package of at 
least €11 billion in loans and grants from the EU budget and EU-based international financial 
institutions, to: 
 help stabilise Ukraine's economic & financial situation 
 support transition 
 encourage political and economic reforms 
 support inclusive development. 
Key elements of the package: 
 €3 billion from the EU budget in the coming years, €1.6 billion in macro financial 
assistance loans (MFA) and an assistance package of grants of €1.4 billion 
 Up to €8 billion from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
 Potential €3.5 billion leveraged through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility 
 Setting up of a donor coordination platform 
 Provisional application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area when 
Association Agreement is signed and, if need be, by autonomous frontloading of 
trade measures 
 Organisation of a High Level Investment Forum/Task Force 
 Modernisation of the Ukraine Gas Transit System and work on reverse flows, notably 
via Slovakia 
 Acceleration of Visa Liberalisation Action Plan within the established framework; 
Offer of a Mobility Partnership 
 Technical assistance on a number of areas from constitutional to judicial reform and 
preparation of elections 
Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm  
 
